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7EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This desk based research report makes a case for a wide-ranging initiative on whistleblower protection. 
It does this by providing argument, evidence, and examples for the following assertions:
1. The notion of ‘whistleblower’ is to be restricted to someone raising a concern about wrongdoing 
within a work relationship context, and has to include both standard as well as non-standard forms 
of employment.
2. Based on estimates in 13 countries, the number of workers who need whistleblower protection at 
some point is estimated at 7% of the workforce. This takes into account that not all whistleblowers 
face retaliation.
3. Whistleblowing is a protracted process rather than a one-off decision. Whistleblowers tend to raise 
their concern with different recipients throughout the process. The vast majority blows the whistle 
inside their organisation in a first instance before raising their concern with an enforcement agency 
or a regulator.
4. Whistleblowing to the media represent only the tip of the whistleblowing iceberg.
5. Forms of retaliation that whistleblowers suffer evolves as the whistleblowing process becomes 
more protracted, with most whistleblowers experiencing formal and informal reprisals before being 
dismissed.
6. Explicit support for whistleblower campaigns from labour union has only recently gained momentum. 
Further experimenting and strategising is required to extend union activity beyond traditional union 
topics (e.g. health & safety). Unions have a role in supporting the whistleblowing process through 
influencing policies and procedures at workplace, national, EU, and international levels, as well as 
supporting individual whistleblower cases throughout the process.
7. Whistleblowing arrangements are an important means of detecting fraud. Robust whistleblower 
protection can facilitate worker’s effectiveness of stopping wrongdoing at an early stage through 
voicing their concern, before scandals erupt and stakeholders incur huge damage.
8. Key provisions of robust whistleblower protection legislation include: burden of proof, forum 
(independence of enforcement agencies), final relief, interim relief, corrective action, support 
services (education and outreach). The report provides a chart of all national whistleblower 
protection legislation and the Greens/EFA proposal for an EU directive on whistleblower’s protection 
in public and private sectors for these 6 key provisions.
9. Although there are many examples of best practices on these 6 key provisions, the overall picture 
of whether and to what extent these key provisions are implemented in whistleblower legislation, 
is one of a mixed bag. This calls for a benchmarking initiative by an intergovernmental multi-
stakeholder authoritative institution such as the ILO.
8
91. SETTING THE SCENE  
FOR WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION
 
This section clarifies the current understanding of key aspects of the whistleblowing phenomenon. More 
precisely who the whistleblower is, how many people are in need of whistleblower protection, forms and 
scope of retaliation against whistleblowers, the protracted process which whistleblowing is, and some 
points on collective action with regard to whistleblower protection.
1.1 WHO IS A WHISTLEBLOWER?
Anyone can as a citizen, a user of public services, a client, or a customer, make complaints or raise 
concerns about wrongdoing that affects the public interest or themselves. However, we speak of 
whistleblowing only when someone has concerns about wrongdoing in a working relationship context. 
The standard academic definition of whistleblowing is “the disclosure by organization members (former 
or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons 
or organisations that may be able to effect action”.1  The Council of Europe Recommendation on the 
protection of whistleblowers defines a whistleblower as “any person who reports or discloses information 
on a threat or harm to the public interest in the context of their work-based relationship, whether it be in 
public or private sector”2.  This section provides reasons for restricting the term whistleblowing to a work 
relationship context.
Experts distinguish between whistleblowers, aggrieved workers, complainants, and bellringers3. 
Whistleblowers are insiders to an institution (e.g. employees, contractors, volunteers, board members) 
in contrast to complainants or bellringers who might be clients, customers, citizen bystanders, NGOs, 
campaigners, or journalists. Hence, the specifics of whistleblowers is that they are people with inside 
knowledge about the wrongdoing that happens in an organisation.
A failure to distinguish someone who discloses wrongdoing as a worker from someone who makes a 
disclosure as a citizen, client, or customer makes it impossible to provide adequate protection for worker 
whistleblowers. It also makes it impossible to prescribe disclosure routes and channels that are appropriate 
for both.
Figure 1 gives an indicative guide to distinguish whistleblowers from complainants, witnesses, bellringers, 
and aggrieved workers based on two dimensions: the type of wrongdoing (public vs private interests) and 
the relationship of the individual to the organisation responsible or involved in the wrongdoing. Although 
the concepts overlap somewhat, whistleblowers are insiders to an organisation and raise concern about 
wrongdoing that affects groups or the public interest.
This makes Edward Snowden (NSA whistleblowing), Irène Frachon (Mediator affaire), and Alain Detour 
(Luxleaks whistleblowing) whistleblowers, but not Julian Assange (Wikileaks). Assange has no working 
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relationship with the organisations Wikileaks publishes documents of. In this sense, Assange’s role is 
similar to the journalists who published the information provided to them by whistleblowers. Alain Detour 
on the other hand, was an employee of PricewaterhouseCoopers, whom he blew the whistle on. Irène 
Frachon was a doctor at the university hospital in Brest when she unveiled that a medicine widely 
commercialized in France was responsible for at least 500 deaths. Edward Snowden was not an employee 
of the NSA, but nevertheless had a working relationship with the NSA through being employed by Booz 
Allen Hamilton, a contractor of the NSA. Snowden performed work at an NSA facility in Hawaii. 
The example of Snowden shows why the notion of ‘working relationship’ for the purposes of whistleblower 
protection needs to be understood to have a broader scope than the standard employer/employee 
relationship. Although there is no official definition of non-standard forms of employment (NSFE), the ILO 
included the following work relationships in its consideration of NSFE at its 2015 meeting of experts: formal 
and informal arrangements of 1) temporary employment, 2) temporary agency work and other contractual 
arrangements involving multiple parties, 3) ambiguous employment relationship, and 4) part-time work.5 
The urgency of whistleblower protection stems from the power imbalance that people experience who 
raise a concern about wrongdoing within a working relationship. This power imbalance results far too often 
in retaliation against those who speak-up in the public interest.   Whistleblower protection aims at restoring 
that balance. It follows that because the power imbalance is even greater in precarious work, it is crucial 
to understand the whistleblower working relationship to include NSFE.
Other working relationships that require a broad notion of ‘worker’ for the purposes of whistleblower 
protection are those of workers in audit bodies, the judiciary, and tax agencies. The wrongdoing they 
Figure 1.  
Distinguishing between whistleblowers, complainants, bellringers, and aggrieved workers
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come across is often not occurring within the premises of their legal employer. Moreover, they often 
have a professional responsibility and obligation to raise the issue and do so through a report, opinion, 
or resolution to prevent and warn about the wrongdoing, yet find themselves unwelcomed or retaliated 
against when they do.
An example of whistleblower protection legislation that does that is the recently enacted Irish Protected 
Disclosures Act 2014. The legislation in Ireland uses a broad notion of ‘worker’, and construes the notion 
of ‘employer’ accordingly for the purposes of whistleblower protection. Provisions in the whistleblower 
legislation in Serbia6 , and new legislation in France7  make a similar broad notion of ‘worker’ 
possible. Details of specific wording used in the Irish whistleblower legislation are provided in Table 1. 
Table 1. Broad notion of worker covered by the Irish Protected Disclosures Act 20148 
Worker means an individual who- Employer, in relation to a worker, means-
is an employee the person with whom the worker entered into, or for whom the worker works or worked under, the contract of employment
entered into or works or worked under any other contract, whether 
express or implied and (if it is express) whether oral or in writing, 
whereby the individual undertook to do or perform (whether 
personally or otherwise) any work or services for another party to 
the contract for the purposes of that party’s business
the person with whom the worker entered into, or works or 
worked under, the contract
works or worked for a person in circumstances in which:
• the individual is introduced or supplied to do the work by a 
third person, and
• the terms on which the individual is engaged to do the work 
are or were in practice substantially determined not by the 
individual but by the person for whom the individual works or 
worked, by the third person or by both of them 
the person for whom the worker works or worked, or the 
person by whom the individual is or was introduced or supplied 
to do the work
is or was provided with work experience pursuant to a training 
course or programme or with training for employment (or with both) 
otherwise than:
• under a contract of employment, or
• by an educational establishment on a course provided by the 
establishment 
the person who provides or provided the work experience or 
training
is or was a member of the Garda Síochána (police force) the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána
is or was a civil servant 
the person by whom the employee is (or, in a case where the 
employment has ceased, was) employed under a contract of 
employment; an individual in the service of a local authority 
shall be deemed to be employed by the local authority;
is or was a member of the Permanent Defence Force or the 
Reserve Defence Force Minister for Defence
1.2 HOW MANY WORKERS NEED PROTECTION?
It would be a mistake to believe the few mediated whistleblower cases give an adequate understanding 
of the scope and size of the whistleblowing phenomenon. Only a minority of workers who raise a concern 
do so outside of their organisation, to a regulator or other enforcement agency (e.g. police or labour 
inspection). An even smaller minority of whistleblowers turns to the press. Research in Australia, the US, 
and Norway finds that less than 10% of whistleblowers ever went outside their own organisation9.  As far 
as whistleblowing to the media is concerned, research in the UK and Australia suggests this happens in 
not more than 1% of whistleblowing cases10. 
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It would be a mistake to believe the 
few mediated whistleblower cases 
give an adequate understanding of the 
scope and size of the whistleblowing 
phenomenon. 
It is also a myth that the media always picks up on wrongdoing reported to them by whistleblowers. 
Whistleblowers often have a hard time getting journalists to be interested in the wrongdoing they disclose. 
Findings from the World Online Whistleblowing Survey shows that those who had been whistleblowers were 
the least likely group to believe whistleblowing to the media is a good idea. Many of these whistleblowers - 
a bigger proportion than those without whistleblower experience - considered that the whistle should never 
be blown to the media, suggesting that many whistleblowers have had bad experiences when going to the 
media, or found the route to be ineffective11. 
Hence, in terms of the size of the phenomenon, media whistleblowing is 
only the tip of the iceberg. In addition, media whistleblowers also give us an 
unrepresentative picture of how whistleblowers are retaliated against. We 
provide more detailed insights into forms of retaliation against whistleblowers 
in section 1.3. It suffices here to state that retaliation ranges from ostracism, 
changed job conditions, demotion, job loss, loss of income, destruction of 
property, assault and even murder12. 
It is difficult to arrive at a precise notion of how many workers are whistleblowers at some stage, i.e. raise 
a concern about wrongdoing - illegal, illegitimate or unethical practices in their work context. Research is 
scarce and there is no truly global survey data that allows a systematic comparison across regions over 
time. Nevertheless, the available scarce data can give us an idea.
In the US, the 2013 National Business Ethics Survey, taken with a representative sample of private sector 
employees at all levels, found that 41% of workers said they had observed misconduct on the job. Of 
these, 63% reported what they saw. Not all of these are in need of whistleblower protection. However, of 
those who reported the wrongdoing they saw, 21% said they experienced retaliation. The report calculates 
that those in need of whistleblower protection13 amount to 6.2 million American private sector workers. 
The first Global Business Ethics Survey conducted with more than 10,000 workers in the private, public, 
and not-for-profit sectors in 13 countries14  shows the following: 33% observed misconduct, of which 59% 
reported the misconduct, with 36% of these experiencing retaliation15.  The implication of this is that 7% 
of the workforce is in need of whistleblower protection !
We know that workers start the whistleblowing process by reporting wrongdoing internally, and most often 
through the hierarchical line (cf. section 1.4 where we provide details of the whistleblowing recipients). 
Research on corruption in the banking sector finds that internal formal whistleblowing procedures typically 
stop with reporting to the immediate line manager. Many of the compliance officers interviewed in that 
research had no idea where else to go when their manager neglected their concern. The author of that 
research writes: ‘There was little guidance on how to escalate complaints, and compliance personnel in 
this position often spent months, and sometimes years, trying to figure out what the appropriate actions 
were, and how to behave’.16
In other words, even where there is whistleblower protection available, 
it often remains unclear how to access it or how to escalate a concern 
without disqualifying oneself for protection. In some countries, advice 
centres have emerged in an attempt to close the access gap to whistleblower protection. The 
advice centre for whistleblowers in the Netherlands registered 324 requests for advice in 2013, 
and 390 in 2014.17  An advice centre for whistleblowers in the UK (Public Concern at Work) handled 
calls from 1,824 whistleblowers in 2014.18  Whilst these numbers are impressive as absolute 
numbers, they remain far removed from the 7% of the workforce needing whistleblower protection. 
1.3 RETALIATION AGAINST WHISTLEBLOWERS
Protecting workers when they blow the whistle requires specific legislation. 
This is because the dynamics of retaliation against whistleblowers can be 
complex. Studies of whistleblower retaliation suggest that many, but not 
all whistleblowers suffer retaliation19.  A series of studies in the US public 
sector suggests between 16% and 38% of employees who blow the whistle 
suffer retaliation. Similar percentages of whistleblower retaliation were found 
7% of the workforce is in need of 
whistleblower protection !
A series of studies in the US public 
sector suggests between 16% and 
38% of employees who blow the 
whistle suffer retaliation.
13
in an Australian study of public sector whistleblowing. In the UK, studies 
using data from a whistleblowing helpline suggest that across sectors, 35-
40% of whistleblowers suffer20.  A study in Norway found retaliation rates to 
be between 7-18%21.  This is explained by strong legislation and very high 
unionisation rates in Norway. A study of American private sector auditors 
who reported wrongdoing showed only 6% experienced retaliation, which 
was explained by specific professional regulation and policies to disclose 
wrongdoing22.  Hence, a national framework that includes specific and 
robust whistleblower protection legislation can make a difference.
Whistleblowers can experience various forms of retaliation: ostracism, 
changed job conditions, demotion, job loss, loss of income, destruction 
of property, assault and even murder23.  It is important to be aware that 
whistleblowing is not a one-off event. Research shows that whistleblowing 
starts with raising concerns inside the organisation where the wrongdoing 
occurs24.  But whistleblowers often have to make numerous attempts to raise 
their concern before that voice is heard. Some of them have to escalate their 
whistleblowing to a regulator or other external bodies. 
It is in this sense that whistleblowing is a protracted process of different 
whistleblowing attempts. A study in the UK25  provides insights into how the retaliation against whistleblowers 
changes throughout the whistleblowing process:
• Formal reprisals such as demotion, relocation, or reassigning job responsibilities are the most common 
type of retaliation at each attempt. The second most common type of retaliation is job loss. 
• There is a pattern of increasing retaliation as the whistleblower needs to make further attempts to get 
their concern heard. However, those who blew the whistle externally to a regulator experienced less 
dismissal but more formal retaliation. 
• Those who blew the whistle to an NGO, union, or professional body experienced more dismissal when 
they did so before going to a regulator. 
The study was done in the UK and in this context the findings might not be 
that surprising. Whistleblower protection legislation - the UK Public Interest 
Disclosure Act - protects whistleblowers who raise a concern with ‘prescribed 
persons’ or regulators. Hence employers become more cautious when 
employees blow the whistle to a regulator. The overall findings of the UK study are 
that when the process is no longer purely dependent on interactions between 
the whistleblower and his or her organisation - i.e. when an external institution 
like a regulator or an enforcement agency takes control of the whistleblowing 
process - the safety and effectiveness of the whistleblower can take a turn for 
the better. This however requires sound and specific whistleblower protection. 
1.4 EFFECTIVE WHISTLEBLOWING REQUIRES 
CHANNELS TO ESCALATE A CONCERN
Research shows that two reasons why workers refrain from blowing the 
whistle are fear of retaliation, and a perception that blowing the whistle will 
be futile and ineffective to stop the wrongdoing26.  Both dimensions are 
related. Whistleblowing is a protracted process rather than a one-off event. 
In this section, we provide insights from research into how the whistleblowing 
process unfolds over different recipients. After that we describe the 3-tiered model adopted in the Council 
of Europe Recommendation on Whistleblower Protection, which provides an ideal framework for designing 
successive channels to escalate a concern. Our assertion is that robust whistleblower protection throughout 
the different levels of whistleblowing (internal - external - media) can provide the condition for making 
whistleblowing effective in correcting wrongdoing.
A study in Norway found retaliation 
rates to be between 7-18%.  This 
is explained by strong legislation 
and very high unionisation rates 
in Norway. A study of American 
private sector auditors who reported 
wrongdoing showed only 6% 
experienced retaliation, which was 
explained by specific professional 
regulation and policies to disclose 
wrongdoing.  Hence, a national 
framework that includes specific 
and robust whistleblower protection 
legislation can make a difference.
The overall findings of the UK 
study are that when the process 
is no longer purely dependent 
on interactions between the 
whistleblower and his or her 
organisation - i.e. when an external 
institution like a regulator or an 
enforcement agency takes control 
of the whistleblowing process - the 
safety and effectiveness of the 
whistleblower can take a turn for 
the better. This however requires 
sound and specific whistleblower 
protection.
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Research shows that workers prefer to report wrongdoing inside their organisation27.  If no clear channels 
are in place, reporting internally can be highly problematic. In the absence of whistleblower arrangements, 
workers are then obliged to voice their concern following hierarchical steps. Internal whistleblowing 
arrangements are designed to sidestep the hierarchical line in order to legitimate worker voice about 
wrongdoing in which their managers are allegedly implied or when workers fear their managers might 
neglect or have neglected their reports.
There are a number of reasons why whistleblowers might be unable to report wrongdoing inside their 
organisation. If the whistleblower has reason to believe that top managers are involved in the wrongdoing, 
we cannot expect the whistleblower to report the concern inside their organisation. If the whistleblower 
has reported the wrongdoing internally and is experiencing retaliation for doing so, it is highly unlikely that 
further internal whistleblowing will be successful in stopping the wrongdoing, and whistleblowers need to 
report externally. It is also possible that a whistleblower has good reasons to believe an internal report will 
be neglected and will result in retaliation. Previous cases of internal whistleblowing in the organisation can 
be the basis of such a reasonable belief. For example, Edward Snowden knew how previous whistleblowers 
in the NSA suffered after they reported internally. Hence, in the above circumstances whistleblowers are 
in effect unable to report wrongdoing internally, and successful whistleblowing must rely on blowing the 
whistle externally. A worker performs an act of trust when he or she reports 
a concern about wrongdoing. Not responding to a report betrays that trust. 
The whistleblower will then perceive the organisation as unable or unwilling 
to take the report seriously, and will have reason to blow the whistle outside 
of the organisation.
Data from two surveys of Australian public sector workers captured the 
sequence of reporting28.  One survey asked respondents to indicate with whom they raised their concern 
the first time, second time, etc. The other survey asked respondents to indicate with whom they raised first, 
and list all subsequent recipients with indicating the sequence. Findings show that 97% of whistleblowing 
starts as voicing a concern internally, and 90% remains internal. It is also clear that line managers and 
senior management are generally the first two ports of call, with the number of whistleblowing attempts 
averaging at 1.9 and 4.3 in the respective surveys.
Data from a survey of NHS Trusts in the UK shows that internally more than half of the Trust employees 
raise their concern first with their line manager either informally (52.3%) or in writing (7.3%). The first 
external recipient of concerns is their trade union (38%), followed closely by professional body (35%)29. 
The study does not give further specification about internal or extern paths. However, it does show that 
those who followed their organisation’s whistleblowing procedure were more likely to proceed to raise their 
concern externally when internal recipients showed to be ineffective or resulted in retaliation.
Data from the Public Concern at Work advice line showed that of a sample of 868 cases, a concern 
had been raised only once in 384 cases (44.2%), twice in 342 cases (39.5%), three times in 120 cases 
(13.8%), and four times in 22 cases (2.5%)30.   Table 2 gives an overview of internal, external, and union 
recipients in the whistleblowing process of these cases, excluding ‘other’.
A worker performs an act of trust 
when he or she reports a concern 
about wrongdoing. Not responding to 
a report betrays that trust. 
Internal External Union Total
first attempt 778 (89.6%) 75 (8.6%) 15 (1.7%) 868 (100.0%)
second attempt 350 (72.3%) 115 (23.8%) 19 (3.9%) 484 (100.0%
third attempt 85 (59.9%) 51 (35.9%) 6 (4.2%) 142 (100.0%)
fourth attempt 10 (45.5%) 11 (50.0%) 1 (4.5%) 22 (100.0%)
Table 2. Internal and external whistleblowing
Whilst there is a substantial decrease in the number of whistleblowers who went on to raise a third time, 
it must be noted that of those who raised a concern a third time about 60% still did so with an internal 
recipient. Even at the fourth instance, an equal number of whistleblowers went internally or to a union 
(45.5% and 4.5% respectively) as to an external recipient (50%). 
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Hence, not only do whistleblowers tend to raise their concern internally 
before they do so externally, but they tend to raise internally more than 
once before going external, if they go external at all. In the sample of 868 
cases, a concern was raised 1,516 times, 80.7% of which was internal, 
16.6% external, and 2.7% to a union representative. Whilst the number of 
those making external disclosures increases as the whistleblowing process 
becomes more protracted, it never surpasses the amount of those willing to 
make internal disclosures.
Interview research with 200 whistleblowers in the US31  found that workers typically raised their concern 
to their line manager and then to senior management, each time believing the recipient would step in to 
correct the situation. Only after voicing their concern internally twice did they consider going to authorities 
outside the organisation. Whistleblowers almost never accurately anticipated the consequences of voicing 
their concern. Nevertheless, one of the most important findings of this research is that:
“[it] is management’s response that shapes the potential whistle-blower’s subsequent actions. 
Specifically, our interviews revealed a common pattern in which management’s efforts to discredit 
or retaliate against the claimant become the major catalyst for the political transformation of the 
concerned employee into a ‘persistent resister32’”.
The Council of Europe Recommendation on the Protection of Whistleblowers clearly stipulates a three-
tiered approach as best practice. The rationale of the three-tiered approach to whistleblowing is that whilst 
wrongdoing is best dealt with as early as possible and at the lowest possible level, there might be however 
cases where organisations, or even regulatory bodies, are not able or not willing to correct their own 
wrongdoing. In these cases, it is in the public interest that these concerns are escalated to a further 
level. The model is explained in the research literature33,  and is based on an analysis of legislative 
developments in the 1990s in Australia and the UK. By distinguishing one internal and two external tiers 
(to a regulator and public), the three-tiered model (Figure 2) maintains a balance between on the one hand 
the public disclosure of information about organisational wrongdoing (i.e. the public’s right to know) and on 
the other hand the organisational interests in keeping such information out of the public realm.
In its first tier, which is internal, the information does not leave the organisation. Workers raise their 
concerns with supervisors, top management, board members, or other designated persons (ethics 
officer, compliance manager, auditor, or internal hotline).
In the second tier, the whistleblower raises his/her concern externally, to an agent acting on behalf of 
the wider society. This includes regulators and enforcement agencies. This second tier is only accessed 
when first tier whistleblowing is unsuccessful, or in other words, when the organisation fails to correct 
the wrongdoing for which it carries responsibility, fails to deal adequately with the concern being raised 
and the person raising it, or when the whistleblower has grounds to believe raising concern internally 
will lead to reprisal or cover-up. Hence, the second tier is an external one, but the public would not 
know the whistle had been blown to that external recipient. Still, this second tier recipient is expected to 
investigate and take action towards the organisation where the wrongdoing occurred. At this stage, the 
content of the concern the whistleblower raises will not only include information about the wrongdoing, 
but also about the organisation’s failure to deal with the internal whistleblowing in a correct way.
Whistleblowers tend to raise their 
concern internally before they do 
so externally, but they tend to raise 
internally more than once before going 
external, if they go external at all.
Figure 2. the 3-tiered approach to whistleblowing
organisation  regulator media
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The third tier is also external, but what distinguishes it from the second tier 
is that third tier whistleblowing involves recipients that imply the information 
and allegation the whistleblower exposes becomes known to the wide public, 
i.e. whistleblowing to the media. As with the content of the concern of the 
whistleblower raised at the second tier, third tier whistleblowing concerns will 
include information about the wrongdoing, about the organisation’s failure 
to deal with internal whistleblowing in a correct way, and about a regulator 
or other second tier recipient not taking the concern seriously. In this sense, 
third tier recipients function as watchdogs over second tier recipients’ failure 
to take their deterring or rectifying duties seriously. In short, the principle of 
the three-tiered model is not that organisations become directly accountable 
to the wider society for their practices, but that they are held accountable for 
dealing adequately with concerns being raised with them and the workers 
raising them. In this sense the media plays an important role as a potential 
final recipient of public interest disclosures.
Specifying escalation routes for whistleblowing in legislation creates 
accountability for internal whistleblowing arrangements. It is in this way that whistleblowing 
legislation can be a driver of institutional reform. Prescribing channels for whistleblowers to 
escalate public interest disclosures is absolutely necessary, both for mandating specific institutions 
to take over investigations from other bodies when whistleblowers signal cover-up or retaliation, 
as well as for ensuring protection for whistleblowers when they need to escalate their concern. 
1.5 COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION
It appears that labour union support for whistleblower protection campaigns and legislation has only 
recently emerged, with the ETUC one of the vocal representatives of that new momentum triggered by the 
Trade Secrets Directive at European level. But not only, there is also the campaign led by Eurocadres with 
the support of more than 40 trade unions and other non-governmental organisations34, and the campaign 
for an ILO standard initiated by the Unión Internacional de Trabajadores de Organismos de Control 
(UITOC, then ULATOC) in 2009. It seems that in some countries unions have tended to see organisational 
whistleblowing policies as an icon of Anglo-Saxon models of transparency, which they fear hinder their 
union mission as representatives of the employees35.  
However, research suggests that three countries saw union campaigning in favour of whistleblower 
protection since the end of the 1990s: Canada, the Netherlands, and Norway36.  In Canada this was 
in the context of whistleblower protection for public officials. In Norway high unionisation rates and the 
strong institutionalisation of industrial dialogue has facilitated representation and protection of internal 
whistleblowers more appropriately than elsewhere. In the Netherlands, the FNV - a union federation with 
a social movement union profile - has been at the forefront of supporting the move towards whistleblower 
protection since the end of the 1990s. It has used this as a way to mobilise workers around social issues 
beyond those typically negotiated in collective agreements.
Historically, workers have joined trade unions in order to obtain some 
collective power. More recently, they have had additional reasons for doing 
so, for example, to access individual representation at disciplinary and 
grievance hearings and to utilise legal, financial and insurance services. 
Lewis and Vandekerckhove37 argue that trade unions have an important part 
to play in successful whistleblowing, and that this requires them to engage in 
particular ways in the whistle- blowing process.
Trade unions have extensive experience of protecting their officials and members from victimisation, 
whether this takes the form of general bullying or harassment or targeted reprisals for engaging 
in safety awareness activities or other union activities. However, the UK whistleblower legislation 
(Part IVA ERA 1996) allows workers to raise concerns about a wide range of alleged wrongdoing 
that may or may not impact on the workplace, for example, about the improper behaviour of 
contractors or suppliers, environmental damage or miscarriages of justice. 
Trade unions have an important part 
to play in successful whistleblowing, 
and that this requires them to 
engage in particular ways in the 
whistle- blowing process.
Prescribing channels for 
whistleblowers to escalate public 
interest disclosures is absolutely 
necessary, both for mandating 
specific institutions to take over 
investigations from other bodies 
when whistleblowers signal cover-up 
or retaliation, as well as for ensuring 
protection for whistleblowers when 
they need to escalate their concern.
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Unions also need to assure their 
members that they will exert 
pressure to ensure that allegations 
are investigated and corrective 
action is taken where appropriate. 
Given the factors known to inhibit potential whistleblowing - fear of retaliation and futility of 
speaking up - unions do not only need to provide members with clear advice about how to speak 
up and the consequences of doing so, but unions also need to assure their members that they 
will exert pressure to ensure that allegations are investigated and corrective action is taken 
where appropriate. This will be familiar territory in relation to cases of bullying and harassment 
and other health and safety issues but perhaps more difficult to achieve in relation to financial or 
environmental by the employer.
One implication is that it is important for unions to acquire the status 
of designated external recipients under an agreed procedure. Another 
implication is that some contractual and legislative changes would be 
needed to enable unions both to protect their members as well as ensure 
that wrongdoing is rectified - i.e. workers will acquire rights through terms 
incorporated into individual contracts of employment from collectively agreed 
whistleblowing arrangements. Whistleblowing policies and procedures might 
an innovative regime for union to experiment with, just like they have started 
doing this for NSFE and ‘gig economy’ jobs. 
Unions could also play a role in campaigning at a national or international level, e.g. for whistleblower 
protection or for creating a positive public perception of whistleblowers. Although in the UK, the TUC is listed 
as a draft committee member for both British Standards Institute PAS1998:2008 and the Whistleblowing 
Code of Practice, there is no union explicitly campaigning in favour of whistleblowers.
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This section discusses why ‘insider knowledge’ from whistleblowers is important in the fight against 
corruption and other wrongdoing. Whilst to our knowledge there is no research available that allows a 
precise analysis to answer that question, we provide three avenues for arguing how whistleblower 
protection contributes to attempts to fight fraud and corruption, and helps to build good governance.
2.1 COST-BENEFIT OF WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS IN ANTI-
FRAUD
Research conducted by Griffith University38  in the Australian public sector 
shows the importance of internal whistleblowing. A majority of the 750 
managers and integrity officers from 14 Australian public sector agencies 
indicated that whistleblowing by employees was a more important way 
in which wrongdoing was brought to light than direct observation, routine 
controls, internal audits, external investigation, and external complaints. A 
recent Global Fraud Report39  showed that in 32% of cases where fraud was 
uncovered, an employee had blown the whistle to provide information that 
facilitated an investigation. In cases where a senior or middle manager was 
a fraudster, that was 41%. This shows that employees can be a key asset in a robust anti-fraud system. 
Whistleblowers were the single most effective way to uncover fraud (41%), followed by 31% through 
external audit and 25% through internal audit.
A comparison between regions underlines the importance of whistleblowing arrangements. The average 
percentage of fraud uncovered by whistleblowers, across countries and across sectors is 41%40.  In 
the US, 48% of cases where fraud was uncovered were facilitated by employees making whistleblower 
disclosures. In the Gulf region that was only 20%. The authors of the Kroll report attribute this difference 
in anti-fraud effectiveness to a lack of internal whistleblowing systems and a lack of federal laws providing 
adequate protection in the Gulf region, in stark contrast to the US.
Obviously, whistleblowing legislation and policies also carry a cost. However, a study of US whistleblower 
programs shows that the benefits outweigh the costs41.  The involvement of whistleblowers in uncovering 
fraud and other wrongdoing implies longer regulatory proceedings. Hence the increased costs. However, 
whistleblower involvement helps regulators to build stronger cases. The benefits of stronger cases are 
a higher success rate in proceedings, and higher monetary penalties. Hence, a specific whistleblowing 
framework for employees who can disclose inside knowledge or organisational wrongdoing is a necessary 
element of an anti-corruption system.
In the UK, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) was created as a financial regulator in 2013. It was 
the successor of the Financial Services Authority (FSA). One of the differences is that the FCA has a 
designated team for receiving and following up on whistleblower reports. In 2013, the FCA opened 72% 
more investigations (254 cases compared to 148) based on whistleblower information than the FSA did 
the year before42.  
2. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION IN 
ANTI-CORRUPTION  
AND GOOD GOVERNANCE?
Whistleblowing by employees 
was a more important way in 
which wrongdoing was brought 
to light than direct observation, 
routine controls, internal audits, 
external investigation, and external 
complaints.
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In the US, research finds that whistleblowers helped to recover more than $1bn in 2003 alone. The same 
research estimates that between 1997 and 2001, the ratio of benefits to costs of whistleblower provisions 
is between 14/1 and 52/1, with a mean of 33/143.  
2.2 BROADER CONSIDERATIONS
Broader consideration than purely monetary cost/benefit analyses also point to benefits to society of 
whistleblower arrangements. Braithwaite, a well-known scholar on regulatory institutions, argues that in 
a context of regulatory capitalism tax advice can shift from a ‘market in virtue’ (where consultants provide 
tax advice in line with the spirit of tax regulation) to ‘markets in vice’ (where they design structures for tax 
avoidance and evasion). Policy makers need to develop a regulatory framework that will make the market 
in virtue more dominant (more demanded) than the market in vice. This requires toughened enforcement 
capabilities for drawing out insider information about looming problems. What works best in this regard are 
‘suites of strategies integrated within a regulatory architecture that allows them to be mutually reinforcing 
most of the time44.’ 
What Braithwaite proposes is to combine whistleblower arrangements at 
the level of enforcement agencies to be combined with an opportunity for 
restorative justice at the level of the organisation. Punitive justice holds 
offenders responsible for the past, whereas restorative justice persuades 
offenders to put things right into the future. The restorative justice entails 
organisations engaging with their stakeholders to correct their own 
wrongdoing at an early stage. Braithwaite’s proposal is in line with the 
3-tiered model we presented in section 1.4. In Braithwaite’s words, one way 
to prevent arrangements that encourage whistleblower to report wrongdoing to a regulator from crowding 
out restorative justice is to ‘give incentives to tax cheats to beat their whistleblower to the tax authority, the 
environmental criminal to beat their whistleblower to the environmental regulator45.’  Organisations need 
to be incentivised to pick up internal whistleblowers before they go outside.
Such incentives will however require provisions to protect whistleblower from retaliation not only when 
they report to a regulator, but also when they raise a concern within their organisation. In this sense, 
robust whistleblower protection will deter organisations from neglecting or retaliating against their 
own whistleblower. If not, regulators will be welcoming the insider information whistleblowers bring. 
2.3 ADEQUATE RESPONSES TO WHISTLEBLOWERS PREVENT 
DAMAGE
In this section we present brief description of cases where damage could have been prevented had 
organisations taken early whistleblowing seriously. These cases reinforce our assertion that if robust 
whistleblower protection can provide an incentive for organisations to correct their own wrongdoing at an 
early stage, such provisions work in the interest of all stakeholders.
Beech Nut case46 
Employees of a babyhood company discovered that one of the products sold as ‘100% pure’ and marketed 
as ‘all natural’ actually contained super water instead of apple concentrate. This had happened as a result 
of a mistake rather than a fraud. They reported this to management, who approached the issue as a cost 
calculation rather than an issue of responsibility to consumers and the nation’s system of food production 
and distribution. Management calculated the cost of destroying unused inventory and recalling products 
at $3.5 million, and decided to continue to sell the product and cover up this mistake. By doing so, they 
turned a mistake into a fraud. This triggered some employees to raise their concern further with a regulator. 
Criminal and civil legal action was taken against the company and its executives, resulting in a financial 
cost of $25 million. The net cost of not taking whistleblowers seriously early on was in this case $21.5 
million, more than 6 times what it would have costed to correct the wrongdoing at the first whistleblowing.
Punitive justice holds offenders 
responsible for the past, whereas 
restorative justice persuades 
offenders to put things right into the 
future. 
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AIB case47 
In 2001, a leading internal auditor of a bank heard anecdotes of branch managers overcharging business 
clients for giving advice to them. The auditor and his team conducted an audit and found that €65 million 
had been wrongly billed to business clients. He sent his report to the bank’s senior management, and 
received assurance that the practice would be stopped and that clients would be refunded. Three months 
later, none of the refunding had happened. Meanwhile, management had mounted a restructuring that 
would see the audit department demoted. Again, he wrote a memo to senior management and the 
Chairman of the bank about unduly delayed refunding and about how a weakened audit department would 
brake Basel guidelines and would be disastrous for the bank’s compliance functions. Some time later, and 
after blowing the whistle internally twice, he was removed as head of internal audit. Eventually a regulator 
stepped in and ordered the refunding of the clients, in addition to a €2 million fine.
Canada case
In Canada, a civil servant disclosed suspicions of fraud to his supervisor and to his trade union that 
helped to reveal millions of misspent public funds in a sponsorship scandal that extended to the top of 
the governing political party.  Allan Cutler first attempted to bring concerns about bid-rigging and political 
interference to the attention of senior management at the Department of Public Works and Government 
Services Canada in 1995.  Eventually his disclosures were substantiated by the Auditor General, whose 
2004 report revealed up to $100 million of a $250 million sponsorship program awarded to governing 
Liberal party-friendly advertising firms and Crown corporations for little or no work. Shortly after, a full-
fledged public inquiry was established by the Prime Minister.  The Gomery Commission Report in turn 
led to the dismissals of many public officials, the criminal conviction and jailing of the senior bureaucrat in 
charge of programme and further criminal charges being brought against corporate executives as late as 
2008.  The cost to the taxpayers of Canada was enormous both due to the scale of the corruption, and the 
aftermath of the scandal.  All avoidable if Allan Cutler’s early warning had been heeded.
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While whistleblower protection laws are increasingly popular, in many cases the rights have been 
largely symbolic and therefore counterproductive. Workers have risked retaliation thinking they had 
genuine protection, when in reality there was no realistic chance they could maintain their careers. In 
those instances, acting on ‘paper tiger’ whistleblower laws has meant the near-certainty that a legal 
forum would formally endorse the retaliation, leaving the careers of reprisal victims far more prejudiced 
than if no whistleblower protection law had been in place at all. Review of the track records for these 
and prior laws over the last three decades has revealed numerous lessons learned, which have steadily 
been solved on the U.S. federal level through amendments to correct mistakes and close loopholes. 
In reality, token laws are ‘cardboard shields’, because anyone relying on them 
is sure to die professionally. Genuine whistleblower laws are ‘metal shields’, 
behind which an employee’s career has a fighting chance to survive. Based 
on 37 years of lessons learned at the Government Accountability Project, 
six ‘best practice’ standards were accepted. All the minimum concepts exist 
in various employee protection statutes currently on the books. These ‘best 
practices’ standards are based on a compilation of national laws from the 
33 nations with minimally credible dedicated whistleblower laws covering 
the national labor force, as well as Intergovernmental Organization policies, 
including those at the United Nations, World Bank, African Development 
Bank, Asian Development Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank. 
The next section provides a chart explaining the best practices, and the section after that provides 
referencing credit for nations whose whistleblower laws make a credible effort to implement them. 
Compliance by the Greens/EFA proposal for an EU Directive on whistleblower’s protection in public 
and private sectors48  with each best practice is included as well. Assuming that whistleblower laws are 
available when and where needed, it also may be useful to spotlight a handful of best practices that 
may appear technical but can make a critical difference in the law’s impact. As a result, an overview of 
differences between whistleblower policies in terms of the following six best practice standards for all 33 
nations with national laws, as well as the Greens/EFA proposal for an EU Directive, is visually presented 
in the form of a table and a chart.
3.1 SIX BEST PRACTICE STANDARDS
Burden of proof: Because they establish the rules of the game for how much evidenced it takes to prove 
a violation, this best practice is essential for the whistleblower to have a fair chance to win. The core 
best practice principle is a reverse burden of proof, requiring the employer to present extra evidence 
of innocent motives whenever a lawful whistleblower demonstrates that retaliation was an issue to any 
degree. 
Forum: The enforcement agency or forum determines whether an unbiased authority will decide if a 
whistleblower’s rights were violated. The key criterion for a best practice is the right to due employment 
disputes. 
Final Relief: Some laws merely cancel any illegal retaliation that is proved. However, unless the 
whistleblower is made whole for all the direct and in direct effects, the victim of illegal retaliation may 
3. INTERNATIONAL 
BEST PRACTICES FOR 
WHISTLEBLOWER POLICIES
Token laws are “cardboard shields,” 
because anyone relying on them is 
sure to die professionally. Genuine 
whistleblower laws are “metal 
shields,” behind which an employee’s 
career has a fighting chance to 
survive. 
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still “lose by winning.” This means the relief must include not only reinstatement and lost pay, but also 
nontangible consequences such as pain and suffering, lost opportunities and reputation, indirect financial 
consequences, expenses from retaliation and expenses from asserting legal rights. 
Interim Relief: When temporary relief is granted until the case concludes, the employer no longer has an 
incentive to prolong conflict, even when it knows ultimate defeat is likely. For unemployed whistleblowers, 
delay can mean they are financially ruined before they have a chance to win. As a result, no single factor 
in a whistleblower law can make a difference more than this best practice criterion.  
Corrective action: Studies consistently confirm that cynicism, the belief that challenging misconduct will 
not make a difference, has a greater chilling effect on would-be whistleblowers than fear of retaliation. 
The core principle for the best practice is a choice of responsible institutions with a mandatory duty and 
procedures to act on the evidence and communicate with the whistleblower. The most effective systems 
also enfranchise the whistleblower to comment on the report’s adequacy. One nation, Serbia, even 
provides the whistleblower access to the investigative file.
Training and outreach: Based on experience, this usually-ignored core of the support services best 
practice is equalled only by temporary relief in its impact. As a rule, neither managers nor employees are 
aware of whistleblowing rights and responsibilities. Similarly, judges and decision-makers make years of 
wildly inconsistent rulings due to lack of initial training. To illustrate the standard for best practice, Serbia’s 
law required judges to be certified before hearing a whistleblower case. It is not a coincidence that after 
the first year, the rulings were consistent and favourable for reprisal victims. It is a wise investment to 
require outreach and education for all who are affected by the law or have responsibilities to implement it. 
3.2 EVALUATING WHISTLEBLOWER LEGISLATION
For the above six best practices, each nation and the Greens/EFA proposal for an EU Directive will be 
evaluated on a 1-3 scale. 
• “1” means an in-depth effort to fully achieve the best practice 
• “2” means the best practice was respected in principle, although in detail the compliance is incomplete. 
• “3” means the best practice was not covered in the whistleblower law49,  too vague to be meaningful, 
or the relevant provision was counterproductive. 
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Ratings for 6 best practice standards
Country B/P Forums Relief -  Final
Relief -  
Interim
Corrective 
action
Training/ 
Outreach
Albania 2 3 2 3 2 3
Australia 2 1 1 1 1 2
Belgium 2 3 2 2 1 3
Bosnia 2 3 2 3 3 3
Canada 3 3 1 3 3 3
Great Britain 3 2 1 1 3 3
Ghana 3 1 1 2 2 3
Hungary 3 3 2 3 2 2
India 2 2 2 2 2 3
Ireland 2 1 1 1 2 3
Israel 3 2 1 3 3 3
Jamaica 2 2 1 3 1 1
Japan 3 3 3 3 3 3
Korea 2 2 1 1 1 3
Kosovo 3 2 2 3 2 3
Liberia 2 1 1 3 2 2
Luxemburg 2 1 2 1 2 3
Malaysia 2 1 1 1 1 3
Malta 3 1 1 1 2 3
Macedonia 3 1 2 1 2 3
Netherlands 3 1 2 3 1 1
Norway 2 1 2 3 2 3
Peru 3 2 2 3 3 3
Rumania 3 1 2 3 3 3
Serbia 1 2 2 1 1 1
Slovakia 2 2 2 1 2 2
Slovenia 2 2 2 3 2 2
South Africa 3 1 2 2 3 3
Uganda 3 1 1 3 2 3
United States 1 1 2 2 1 2
Zambia 3 1 1 1 2 3
Proposal 
EU Directive 1 1 2 3 1 2
Table 3. Rating for 6 best practice standards
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As set out earlier in this report whistleblowing is accepted worldwide as a key 
element in the fight against corruption and tackling gross mismanagement in 
the public and private sectors.  It is also increasingly viewed as an essential 
aspect of freedom of expression, particularly with respect to the public’s right 
to know and access to information, as well as freedom of conscience50. 
However, most, if not all, of the whistleblower laws that have and continue 
to be adopted around the world focus on the protection of workers 
and those in working relationships. This section further discusses how 
whistleblowing is at the nexus of public interest, labour unions, and the ILO. 
4.1 CONNECTING PUBLIC INTEREST AND 
LABOUR LAW 
The activities of organizations – in the public and private sectors – affects 
people in real and direct ways, in the public services provided and in the 
products sold. No matter what systems are put in place, things can go 
wrong. Whistleblowing is primarily about communication; whistleblower protection can therefore be 
seen as ensuring that information channels are not blocked or improperly diverted. Inside organizations, 
whistleblowing can act as an early warning system but, importantly, whistleblowing is also a matter of 
public responsibility.  It saves lives and livelihoods. 
Some of the conceptual confusion around whistleblowing protection stems from the range of public interest 
information that may form the basis of a whistleblowing disclosure; it may concern health and safety, 
environment, or gross mismanagement of public funds in any area of government.  All are issues that 
unions around the world have been at the forefront of fighting for in terms of better protections for their 
members, families and communities. However, the fact that whistleblowing interacts with several different 
areas of law and policy is also one of the reasons governments claim not to 
know or are genuinely uncertain about where whistleblower protection fits 
within government.  Where it has been most successful is when the focus 
has been on workers’ rights to be protected.  
Legal and policy protections for whistleblowers are firmly rooted in labour and 
employment law.  In the US, civil service reform in the 1970s provided the 
early context for implementing whistleblower protection across the federal 
sector - linking whistleblower protection to public accountability.  
The International Labour Convention on Termination of Employment of 1982 (Articles 4 and 5) was one 
of the first  international instruments to include whistleblower protection by providing that filing a complaint 
or participating in proceedings against an employer are not  valid reasons for dismissal. The Convention 
also made it clear in Article 9 that the burden for proving the reason for dismissal should rest on the 
employer where possible and in the case of protecting whistleblowers this reverse burden of proof has 
been essential.
4. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR 
ORGANISATION AND 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION
Whistleblowing is accepted 
worldwide as a key element in 
the fight against corruption and 
tackling gross mismanagement 
in the public and private 
sectors.  It is also increasingly 
viewed as an essential aspect 
of freedom of expression, 
particularly with respect to 
the public’s right to know and 
access to information, as well 
as freedom of conscience.
Inside organizations, whistleblowing 
can act as an early warning system 
but, importantly, whistleblowing is 
also a matter of public responsibility.  
It saves lives and livelihoods. 
28
Most of the work done since 1982 at the regional level51  built on these early ILO 
measures and did so primarily through the lens of fighting corruption. Article 
33 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC, 2003), for 
example, provides that: “Each State Party shall consider incorporating into 
its domestic legal system appropriate measures to provide protection against 
any unjustified treatment for any person who reports in good faith and on 
reasonable grounds to the competent authorities any facts concerning 
offences established in accordance with this Convention.”  Further, Article 8 
encourages State parties to consider “establishing measures and systems to 
facilitate the reporting by public officials of acts of corruption to appropriate 
authorities, when such acts come to their notice in the performance of their 
functions.” One of the reasons for the UNODC to publish a resource guide 
on best practices in 2015 (discussed briefly below) is because UNCAC did 
not use the term whistleblower nor elaborate on the specific need to protect 
workers in law, including public official.
A focus on Europe provides a good example of how this anti-corruption 
agenda has played out, starting with the work of the Council of Europe on 
whistleblower protection within the anti-corruption agenda in the late 1990s. 
More recently, the Council of Europe has emphasized whistleblowing within 
a democratic and human rights framework, a framework unions know well. 
Both approaches overlap.  
In 1999, the Council of Europe adopted two conventions, the Civil Law Convention Against Corruption 
(ETS, No.174) and the Criminal Law Convention Against Corruption.  Article 9 of the Civil Law Convention 
provided for the right for civil servants to report wrongdoing and be protected - each party is required to 
“provide in its internal law for appropriate protection against any unjustified sanction for employees who 
have reasonable grounds to suspect corruption and who report in good faith their suspicion to responsible 
persons or authorities.”  
However, this did not mean that the impact of whistleblowing in other key areas were ignored at the 
European level.  In fact the European Parliament’s mid-term review of the EU strategy 2007-2012 on 
health and safety at work called for an EU ‘directive protecting individuals who legitimately warn of OHS 
[Occupational Health and Safety] unacknowledged risks, notably by notifying the appropriate labour 
inspectorate’.  The European Court of Human Rights has made some significant rulings with regards to 
whistleblowing setting out key principles to apply when considering Article 10 rights - right to freedom of 
expression - in particular.  Many of the cases concern public servants who disclosed information about 
wrongdoing they discovered within their service. 
One of the leading cases heard by the European Court of Human Rights is that of Guja v. Moldova [no. 
14277/04, 12 February 2008].  The Court found a violation of Article 10 because the applicant had been 
dismissed for disclosing information that was truthful and of legitimate interest to the public. The Court took 
and continues take a fairly progressive position in its developing jurisprudence on whistleblower protection 
in favour of freedom of expression as an essential foundation of a democratic society - even with respect 
to the disclosure of potentially classified or secret information:  
“In this respect the Court notes that a civil servant, in the course of his work, may become aware of 
in-house information, including secret information, whose divulgation or publication corresponds to a 
strong public interest. The Court thus considers that the signalling by a civil servant or an employee in 
the public sector of illegal conduct or wrongdoing in the workplace should, in certain circumstances, 
enjoy protection. This may be called for where the employee or civil servant concerned is the only 
person, or part of a small category of persons, aware of what is happening at work and is thus best 
placed to act in the public interest by alerting the employer or the public at large. (para. 72)”.
The Court has confirmed in this and a series of other cases that the protection of Article 10 extends to the 
workplace in general, and to public servants in particular.  It also takes into account, as one of the factors to 
be considered, whether there are safe alternative channels for disclosing the information without removing 
the right to disclose information publicly where necessary in a free and democratic society.  This again, is 
an area that the ILO could provide strong guidance.  
The International Labour Convention 
on Termination of Employment of 
1982 (Articles 4 and 5) was one of 
the first  international instruments 
to include whistleblower protection 
by providing that filing a complaint 
or participating in proceedings 
against an employer are not  valid 
reasons for dismissal. The Convention 
also made it clear in Article 9 that 
the burden for proving the reason 
for dismissal should rest on the 
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this reverse burden of proof has been 
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The former Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner, Thomas Hammarberg, stated in 2009 that 
whistleblowing (along with a free media and independent judiciary) are vital to protecting human rights. 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) recommended a cross-sectoral approach 
covering ‘warnings against various types of unlawful acts, including all serious human rights violations.’ 
This led in 2014 to the Council of Europe adopting a Recommendation on the Protection of Whistleblowers 
- the first legal instrument to set out clear guidance to member States with respect to providing for a legal 
and institutional framework for protection whistleblowers.  It emphasized the importance of protecting of a 
wide range of workers. 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Council of Europe Recommendation explains that Principles 3 and 
4 take a broad and purposive approach to the range of individuals who might come across wrongdoing in 
the workplace or through their work-related activities: 
“From the perspective of protecting the public interest, these are all individuals who by virtue of a de 
facto working relationship (paid or unpaid) are in a privileged position vis-à-vis access to information 
and may witness or identify when something is going wrong at a very early stage – whether it 
involves deliberate wrongdoing or not. This would include temporary and part-time workers as well 
as trainees and volunteers. In certain contexts and within an appropriate legal framework, member 
States might also wish to extend protection to consultants, freelance and self-employed persons, and 
sub-contractors; the underlying reasons for recommending protection to whistleblowers being their 
position of economic vulnerability vis-à-vis the person on whom they depend for work. (para. 45)”
The changing nature of work has had a huge impact on unions and this has been equally true in the area 
of whistleblower protection.   
The Explanatory Memorandum situates the role of unions within Principle 15 on alternative protected 
disclosure channels and Principle 28 on access to independent advice.  These are both vital ways in which 
unions already interact with their members.  However, there remains confusion about how unions should 
engage with this issue. 
This came up in a recent survey by a Polish organisation, the Stefan Batory Foundation52.   The Report 
summarized the results of a survey of trade union and employer organisations on how whistleblowers are 
viewed in the country.  While the Polish government has argued that no new laws are required because 
relevant labour law antidiscrimination provisions are in force and employees can rely on the support 
from trade unions, trade unions representatives interviewed were not clear on how to identify who was a 
whistleblower and what constituted whistleblowing.  This tended to make them view whistleblowers with 
some suspicion.  The unions did say that the role of employees trying to protect the public interest should 
be strengthened by giving more powers to trade unions and social labour inspectors.  While both unions 
and employer representatives were cautious about the need to adopt new regulations, they did concede 
that existing legal and institutional frameworks intended to protect employees were far from satisfactory. 
As in Poland, in many parts of the world there is little awareness about how strong whistleblower protection 
would protect unions’ interests as well as the wider public interests.  Unfortunately, this can play into the 
hands of the few organisations who may wish to avoid strong inspection or enforcement of rules, and 
importantly it can play into the hands of corrupt individuals, some in senior positions. 
The ILO can play a key role in emphasizing the need for unions and employers to be engaged from the 
outset, advocating for whistleblower protection and being consulted at an early stage on what is needed 
and how legal provisions should work.  The isolation of individual whistleblowers creates vulnerability 
- which unions as collective action bodies can address.  The issue of individual vulnerability is serious 
generally for the public interest but it becomes even more serious when it is clear that disclosures properly 
communicated and heeded could save tax payers millions of dollars, and protect the jobs of those 
innocently caught up in the aftermath of a scandal or disaster when a problem is not addressed.  
There has been some though not strong enough acknowledgement of the importance of unions and 
employers in the protection of whistleblower at the wider international level.  As mentioned earlier 
the UNODC published a Guide on Best Practices in the Protection of Reporting persons in 2015.  It 
improves on the work done by the Council of Europe with respect to the role of unions in that it makes 
it clear that there should be consultation on any legislative project to protect whistleblowers. The Guide 
recommends in its checklist (p.87) that as part of a national assessment, member States should a) review 
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the existing legal framework and institutional arrangements in order to strengthen existing good practice 
and identify gaps and b) consult broadly with relevant government, business, union, legal and civil society 
representatives to plan sensible and sustainable reforms.  However, there is little detail on their specific 
role and importantly how to raise awareness on the importance of whistleblower protection in their work. 
4.2 UNIONS - A VITAL PARTNERSHIP
Two of the most progressive laws to be passed in recent years are rooted in public service reform and 
employment law.  In Ireland, the current Labour Party leader, Brendan Howlin, guided the Protected 
Disclosure Act 2014 onto the statute books when he was Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform. 
Hailed by the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) as a “major step forward” and by the Services, 
Industrial, Professional and Technical Union (SIPTU) as “one of the most important pieces of employment 
legislation,” the law covers and protects employees, contractors, agency workers and people gaining work 
experience. 
In Serbia, the Ministry of Justice started the formal process of drafting a law on workplace whistleblowing 
in 2013, and in keeping with the multidisciplinary approach recommended by the Council of Europe and the 
United Nations, it set up a working group of more than 20 key representatives from the relevant ministries; 
judges from all court levels, including the Deputy President of the Supreme Court; representatives of the 
major unions and employers associations, including the chambers of commerce; as well as civil society 
representatives.  The Serbian MoJ also conducted wide public consultations.
The Serbian Whistleblower Protection Act, 2015, like the Irish law, takes the best of the international 
standards available but in working with the unions and other key players it has adopted a law that is 
ambitious as it is realistically grounded in national law and traditions. The active engagement of unions 
and employee representatives from an early stage not only means they understand exactly how the law 
is meant to work, it helps ensure better and earlier protection for workers without necessarily requiring 
judicial recourse.  The unions in both Ireland and Serbia are in a strong position to monitor the law over 
time and to lead the call for reforms where necessary.  
In some parts of the world, unions have been very active in helping create workplace conditions that 
are conducive to whistleblowing and the protection of whistleblowers.  The RED DE TRABAJDORES de 
Control Público, Fiscalización, Recaudación y Justicia of Argentina is one of them53.  Since its creation in 
2014 the RED has been working on capacity building, representation of workers whistleblowers, and as a 
depository of complaints, among other things. 
In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment commissioned a study and found that 
both employers and employees wanted a code of conduct to help them put in place the necessary reporting 
arrangements. The Labour Foundation – a consultative body of employer and employee representatives - 
was asked to work on this project and the result was a Statement on Dealing with Suspected Malpractices 
in Companies54.   
Essentially this was a Code of Practice between the unions and employers to guide the conduct of 
employers and encourage responsible use of arrangements and policies by employees.  Their efforts 
built on existing common values of service and conduct across all workplaces, and so were not seen as 
limited only to the private sector. The exercise also clarified that employers and heads of services in all 
sectors should endeavour to ensure that there is adequate training for those charged with responsibility 
under any whistleblowing or reporting arrangements on how to handle reports and individuals fairly, 
and to ensure the arrangements are clearly explained to all staff members and working partners (e.g. 
volunteers, contractors, etc.).   This excerpt from the Introduction explains the reasoning behind the Labour 
Foundation’s involvement: 
“The Labour Foundation is happy to comply with this request [from the Ministry of Social Affairs]. In its view, 
it is important to lay down conditions enabling employees to bring any malpractice within their companies 
to light without putting themselves at risk, giving their employers an opportunity to rectify it. Not only is this 
safer for the employees involved, but it is also in the interests of companies since management should 
be made aware of suspected malpractice as soon as possible so that it can take steps against them. 
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In addition, it may be possible to resolve the situation before the employee is forced to resort to 
whistleblowing [i.e. outside the company.] The Foundation’s statement is intended as an initial 
step towards creating company or industry-level guidelines for reporting suspected malpractice.” 
4.3 THE VITAL ROLE OF THE ILO
Active union involvement in calling for better and stronger whistleblower protection is increasing outside 
the US - where it has traditionally been the strongest - and in Europe most clearly.  See for example the 
initiatives mentioned in section 1.5. Others also voiced and concerns about rules such as those set out 
in the EU Directive on Trade Secrets that establish private ownership rights over increasing swathes 
of information, with little open public debate or public interest safeguards, including protections for 
whistleblowers and journalists.  
The need for strong standard setting and forwarding looking guidance specifically for union and labour 
engagement is clear.  The risk is that by failing to do so, whistleblowers are rendered even more vulnerable 
to being isolated and discredited, and their important messages of serious wrongdoing or risk of harm to 
the public interest will be missed.  There is also the concern that without strong labour support in specific 
whistleblower cases, and laws that protect such individuals, the chilling effect on the work environment 
will be such that other workers who might otherwise have come forward with serious concerns will be too 
afraid to do so.   
Increasingly around the world the space for civil society and unions to advocate in the public interest is 
being contested and challenged.  This can help explain the increasing awareness of the importance of 
protecting a free and independent media; investigative journalism that can probe into serious concerns 
as a pillar of a free society that can hold power to account.  In parts of the world where corruption is rife 
and public institutions are weak, the public interest in protecting journalists and protecting whistleblowers 
are converging more clearly than ever.  The same is true of unions.  The role of unions and employee 
representatives in protecting the interests of workers, the environment and the public purse converges with 
interest of protecting individuals who are close to the problem and can more easily identify it.  
The ILO set the stage for stronger whistleblower protection around the world in 1982, strong labour rules and 
rights in protecting the environment, workers and human rights are needed more than ever.  The ILO has an 
opportunity to set a new pace and higher standards so that workers around the world can defend the public 
interest with confidence for many years to come.
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5. CONCLUSION
Whistleblowing is a protracted process that involves workers raising a concern about wrongdoing a 
number of times with different recipients internal and external to the organisation where the wrongdoing 
occurs, in an attempt to get the wrongdoing stopped. The notion of ‘whistleblower’ applies to the context 
of working relationships, including both standard as well as non-standard forms of employment.
Although whistleblowing arrangements bear a cost, their benefits in terms of detecting fraud or stopping 
wrongdoing at an early stage outweigh these costs. Nevertheless, people who do speak up often 
experience retaliation. The number of workers in need of whistleblower protection is estimated at 7% 
of the workforce.
While whistleblower protection laws are increasingly popular, in many cases the rights have been largely 
symbolic and therefore counterproductive. Employees have risked retaliation thinking they had genuine 
protection, when in reality there was no realistic chance they could maintain their careers. Based on 
experience in representing whistleblowers who call of legislation to protect them in court, this report 
regards the 6 most important aspects to be burden of proof, forum (independence of enforcement 
agencies), final relief, interim relief, corrective action, support services (education and outreach).
Although the report identified many examples of best practices on these 6 key provisions, the overall 
picture of whether and to what extent these key provisions are implemented in whistleblower legislation 
around the world, shows huge variation. This calls for a benchmarking initiative by an intergovernmental 
multi-stakeholder authoritative institution such as the ILO.
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